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Academic Friendship in Dark Times 
 
Penny Enslin and Nicki Hedge 
 
Bringing philosophical work on friendship to bear on the growing body of critique about the state of the neoliberal academy, this paper defends 
academic friendship. Initially a vignette illustrates the key features of academic friendship and the multiple demands on academics to account 
for themselves in the neoliberal university. We locate academic friendship in the context of that neoliberal university before discussing 
managerialist threats to this relationship. We indicate how the performativity-driven working environment contrasts radically and 
unfavourably with some defining features of friendship. Academic friendship, we argue, can entail generative intellectual and moral activity 
and growth though trusting and honest reflection on research and scholarship, and teaching and learning. Contending that it may offer an 
antidote to aspects of the neoliberal academy, in our concluding section academic friendship is highlighted as both a defence and a means of 
resistance against the worst excesses of the university in dark times. 
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As two professors at a leading British university reflect on their recently completed annual 
Performance and Development Reviews (PDRs), they express relief that their performances have been 
found adequate. Taylor and Tyler had previously confided in each other that neither expected the 
highest grading although one of them had been judged outstanding in garnering esteem indicators 
while the other had been deemed outstanding with respect to their ‘outputs’.i Yet, they feel uneasy 
about the number of days the PDR process absorbed, as they amassed the required evidence of their 
performances and articulated that against the various key performance indicators (KPIs) used to 
judge them. They share a wry smile as they talk about how they now both feel tired and empty and, yet 
again, they bemoan their frustration at the effort also exerted on tending their digital footprints and 
tweaking their online signatures to display recent publications, affiliations and indicators of esteem. 
They recount how in their PDRs they articulated, as required, their loyalty to their university’s chosen 
values, pondering how those values were decided and what they might have chosen. Both are worried 
that they will not be able to find enough time to enhance the postgraduate course they teach in a year 
ahead that, once again, is focussed on targets that leave little space for anything beyond their 
SMARTii objectives. Each is concerned about the evident exhaustion and disillusionment shown by the 
other. They both despair of having to account for themselves in ways that suggest they may not be 
trusted to fulfil their professional obligations if left to their own devices.  Friends for years, these 
conversations are not new but, feeling things are getting worse, they talk of their friendship as 
therapy for ‘dark times’ in universities. To cheer themselves, they turn to the paper they are co-
writing. They both regard their writing as an antidote to their feelings of despondency, while feeling 
relieved that it will also be counted as a performance objective.  
 
This vignette imagines a conversation between two academic colleagues who are both personal and 
professional friends. It reflects a friendship that sustains them and their work in dark times, as they 
deal with the multiple demands to account for themselves in what we now know as the neoliberal 
university. This paper brings the substantial philosophical literature on the concept of friendship to 
bear on the growing body of critique about the state of the neoliberal academy. In exploring the 
significance and value of workplace friendships we draw these two strands together to articulate and 
defend what we call academic friendship, a relationship under threat. Initially we draw on the vignette 
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to delineate the key features of friendship by deploying accounts prominent in the philosophical 
literature. Thereafter our defence of academic friendship locates this professional relationship in the 
context of the neoliberal university that is staffed by academic labourers. We then discuss the threats 
to academic friendship posed by managerialism before concluding by defending academic friendship 
as an antidote to the worst excesses of the neoliberal academy.  In drawing our conclusions we 
suggest that academic friendship offers an important space of both support and potential resistance.  
Friendship, personal and academic 
A number of the key characteristics of friendship, understood as ‘a distinctively personal relationship’ 
(Helm 2017), are exemplified in this vignette. Although the word ‘friend’ can indubitably cover a 
‘dizzying array of relationships’ (Spencer and Pahl, 2006, 58), some key features are salient in an 
exploration of friendship for philosophers of education who are well placed to scrutinise and to defend 
this relationship. We can reasonably infer, in Tyler and Taylor’s relationship, a personal relationship 
that has developed over time. The two characters like and trust each other enough to confide, to share 
personal experiences and feelings. Their concern for the welfare of each other implies mutuality and a 
lack of hierarchy as they share activities in and through their work. To this extent their relationship 
meets Telfer’s (1970-1971) necessary, though not sufficient, shared activity condition for friendship. 
Further necessary characteristics of friendship for Telfer (1970-71, 224) include affection, and 
concern for one another’s happiness and welfare, distinct from both a general sense of duty and 
benevolence, insofar as friendship is characterised by a ‘special concern for friends’.  This friendship 
entails a commitment to each other as particular individuals rather than to abstract others who might 
happen to hold similar characteristics, personalities or attitudes (Friedman 1993; Hooker and Little 
2000).   
 
Neither Taylor nor Tyler made a conscious choice - a decision to become friends - and their friendship 
was not mandated. Rather, over a period of time, and as a result of certain friendship characteristics 
that gradually became evident as they worked together, they grew to like and trust each other. They 
came to enjoy each other’s company, to agree on many, though not all, academic and professional 
issues, and to value each other’s opinions – even those critical of each other’s behaviour. Hence we 
can now say their relationship meets all of Telfer’s (1970-71, 230) three necessary conditions for 
friendship: ‘shared activities, the passions of friendship, and acknowledgement of the fulfilment of the 
first two conditions, constituting an acknowledgement of and consent to the special relationship’.  On 
this account friendship is voluntary, chosen rather than given in two ways, following Friedman 
(1993). Firstly, we choose, within limits, our friends. Secondly, as those friendships develop, we 
choose with our friends, ‘the extent of mutual support and nurturance, the depth of shared intimacy, 
and so forth’ (Friedman, 1993, 208). A given was that they both happened to work in the same 
university, with some of their academic activity intersecting, but Taylor and Tyler’s friendship, a 
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relationship transcending workplace association, was voluntary. Over time they established and made 
further choices about the nature of that relationship. So this academic friendship meets Friedman’s 
(1993, 211) ‘fullest possible realization’ of friendship: it is both chosen and imbued with ‘affection 
and positive regard, mutuality, equality, and trust’. The equality playing out in Tyler and Taylor’s 
friendship goes beyond their job status. While they bring different personalities, academic strengths, 
interests, and workplace roles to the relationship their friendship is not hierarchical: each regards the 
other as both an intellectual and moral equal. There is a rough balance, over time and contexts, of 
giving and taking, supporting and being supported, and learning and teaching from and with each 
other.  On those grounds then, strictly speaking, this academic friendship does not meet an 
Aristotelian account of ideal friendship requiring equality in status, advantage, pleasure and ‘moral 
goodness’ (Cooper 1977, 628).  But we assert a conception of real rather than ideal friendship 
(Friedman 1993, 216) premised on a ‘rough equality’, an approximate symmetry, between friends. 
This is not a sentimentalised notion of friendship as it recognises that friends do quarrel, they do 
occasionally betray one another, and friendships can come to an end.  
With initial conditions in place we can now consider each of Aristotle’s forms of and motivations for 
friendship: pleasure, virtue and utility and we do so in that order and premised on their 
interconnections. Having already alluded to the pleasure Tyler and Taylor derive from their 
friendship, we note that this plays out with respect to the ways in which they enjoy time together as 
friends who ‘delight not in some commodity produced by their interaction, but in their mutual 
activities and in what could be called each other's personality’ (Alpern 1983, 314). While seeking the 
company of one’s friends is a further key element of friendship for Telfer (1970-71), a relationship of 
pleasure alone is not an adequate motivation for making or sustaining a friendship. The same pertains 
to utility and virtue. With respect to Aristotle’s ideal friendship of virtue, Cooper (1977, 626) argues 
that this does not require only friends who are ‘moral heroes’. Similarly, Telfer (1970-71) rejects the 
view that friends must think of each other as perfectly good people all of the time, thereby reinforcing 
Friedman’s (1993) account of  real friendship in the real world and our argument that we are not 
aiming for ‘ideal’ friendship here.  So while Taylor and Tyler most likely do not entirely approve or 
applaud each and every aspect of each other’s characters or behaviours this does not render their 
friendship untenable or defective. They regard each other with affection and concern and they respect 
each other. Hence we can term Tyler and Taylor’s relationship a virtue friendship because the ‘good 
qualities of the person's character, and not pleasure or advantage’ (Cooper 1977, 627) has caused each 
to like the other.  Relatedly, and importantly as our defence of academic friendship unfolds, Taylor 
and Tyler talk of the trust they place in each other in ways akin to Friedman’s (1993) concept of 
reliable moral witnessing. They speak of the value they attach to the other-regarding and other-
trusting space their friendship affords to rehearse and question their own moral and professional 
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standpoints, concerns and conduct with each other, so benefitting from a perspective ‘informed by an 
alternative set of principled moral commitments’ (Friedman 1993, 210).  
Having noted the voluntary and alluded to the non-instrumental characteristics of  Taylor and Tyler’s 
relationship, we do not deny utility a place in our account of this academic friendship. However, we 
concur with Brewer’s (2005, 723) interpretation: ‘neither genuine Aristotelian friendship nor its 
attendant benefits can be attained by those who value their friends merely as a means to some further 
good, including the good of self-improvement’.  In the conception of friendship we defend as 
appropriate to the complementary personal and professional dimensions of what we call academic 
friendship, notions of utility co-locate with mutuality and reciprocity as well as with pleasure and 
virtue. While undeniably valuable, the sort of friendship enjoyed by Tyler and Taylor is not, for the 
most part, instrumental: it has been neither forged nor evolved to meet particular goals. Spencer and 
Pahl (2006, 60) categorise friendship on a continuum of simple to complex with simple including 
associate, useful contact, favour friend and fun friend, and complex including helpmate, comforter, 
confidante, and soulmate. Tyler and Taylor, at moments in their friendship, probably realise each of 
these types. However, our interest here, and the conditions for friendship already explicated, preclude 
a purely instrumental relationship and focus on the complex elements of this categorisation.   We 
contend that while friendship certainly has some benefits, as White observes: ‘for instrumental 
reasons, even perhaps lofty ones, like its role in the promotion of self-knowledge’, it is not 
predominantly an instrumentally motivated relationship (1990, 82). 
However, a voluntary commitment to another as a friend does make particular moral demands. On 
Friedman’s quasi-voluntary account, a number of the general characteristics of friendships noted 
above might be regarded as ‘special requirements of friendship’ (1993, 212). At times these 
requirements may inconvenience friends and may trump what they owe to those not considered 
friends. Herein, of course, is a particularly thorny issue for friendship which, following Friedman, 
‘provides for the morally unimpaired expression of personal commitment’ that will not pertain to 
relationships lacking in mutuality and equality (1993, 214). Tyler and Taylor do not have the same 
degree of personal concern, loyalty or commitment to colleagues not considered friends as they do to 
each other. Friedman (1993, 213) is, however, clear that this does not mean that special commitments 
to friends of necessity override or are subordinate to comparable duties in non-voluntary close 
relationships such as kinship.  We return to this later but we suggest that the special duties owed to 
academic friends will not, necessarily, trump those duties institutionally ascribed to and morally 
chosen by Taylor and Tyler. They are both loyal to their institution and they readily accept and seek to 
enact broad institutional, professional and collegial values particularly when these are moral choices. 
So while some of the features of friendship delineated so far might seem reminiscent of apparently 
related concepts like solidarity, they are significantly different. Solidarity may also express mutuality 
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and a principled concern for the good of others, but it does not match the defining features of 
friendship outlined above.    
The personal and professional friendship we have described so far has drawn on a set of 
complementary concepts that start to distinguish this workplace relationship from those between other 
academic colleagues. We have emphasised that the concepts of trust, affection, pleasure in each 
other’s company, rough equality, concern for each other’s welfare, and shared activities pertain in a 
chosen relationship that reflects voluntary, beneficial, pleasurable and virtuous friendship. Yet while 
not formalised or structured by any institutionalized agreement, academic friendships are located and 
performed in an institutional setting, that of the university. It is to this institution that we now turn, as 
we consider its contemporary characteristics and their implications for academic friendship. 
The academic labourer in the neoliberal university 
Writing about friendship and the challenge of resisting the forces of neoliberalism, May observes that 
if we are to understand ourselves and ‘the difficulty and perhaps even the darkness of who we are 
asked to be, then we must come to grips with neoliberalism’ (2012,4). The account of the neoliberal 
university that follows suggests it is both a problematic context for and a reason to defend academic 
friendship. The near-global entrenchment of neoliberalism in higher education reflects the hegemonic 
hold of a market capitalist model of education. For Shamir it is: 
… a complex, often incoherent, unstable and even contradictory set of practices that are 
organized around a certain imagination of the “market” as a basis for the universalisation of 
market-based social relations, with the corresponding penetration in almost every single 
aspect of our lives (Shamir 2008, 3, quoted by Ball 2012, 18).  
 
The market-determined practices that distinguish the neoliberal university include its embrace of a 
competitive market in delivering commodified qualifications and research outputs to student 
customers and funding bodies, with institutions competing with one another to be globally 
competitive in their sales.  So, too, universities are in service to competitive national economies, while 
vying to claw their way up league tables, seeking strategic positionality to make them ever more 
competitively successful. Higher education is now defined and determined as a saleable product rather 
than as a public good with a fundamentally social and moral purpose, valued for its intrinsic worth 
alongside its benefits to society and the economy. 
As they embrace the audit culture that now prevails in the higher education sector, ‘universities are 
part of capitalism and academics are embedded into class relations’ (Allmer 2018, 56). The features of 
friendship we delineated above are practised by academic labourers whose working lives are 
controlled by a battery of technologies intended to optimize their productivity by requiring them to 
meet defined targets and produce measurable outcomes. The time and labour of academics constitute 
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an expense measured by workload models designed to extract maximum labour value. Growing 
numbers of labourers are employed on casual short and fixed term contractsiii although some 
universities have implemented policies to employ academic staff on fixed-term hourly paid or 
fractional contracts in preference to casual worker or zero-hours contracts.  Furthermore, Bothwell 
(2018a) suggests that: ‘Precarity is a significant feature of the academy worldwide’, citing a UK 
professor who felt more secure as a junior lecturer in the 1980s than in today’s academy with its 
‘modern pressure to meet performance targets - with the threat of ultimately losing your job if you 
fail’. In the dark times of today’s neoliberal academy what cannot be readily measured cannot be 
valued.  
The neoliberal academy frames and constrains the identities and ways of being available to academic 
labourers, the selves they can become, and the workplace relationships they can construct and enjoy. 
Of import to any consideration of academic friendship, ‘Social relationships with colleagues and 
students, the fulcrum of academic productivity, are reduced to de-humanised performance indicators’ 
(Sutton 2017, 628).  At the same time, technologies of performativity to ensure compliance in the 
measured university are regularly ratcheted upwards. Layered on top of now standard measures of 
outputs, esteem and KPIs, academic labourers are required to declare their loyalty to institutional 
values that are often accompanied by a further requirement to state how they have enacted them. 
Hence there is often an obligation to demonstrate how one realises corporate values such as being 
passionate, people-oriented, ambitious, flexible, professional and inquisitiveiv . Such requirements 
soon become normalised, largely accepted as part of the inevitability of the audit culture, in spite of 
initially being seen as controversial, if not absurd.  
Despite references to ‘valuing people’ in the display of many universities’ avowed values, the culture 
of checking up and target-setting has displaced more collegiate understandings of the university, its 
purpose and governance, in which academics were more frequently trusted to do their work. This has 
had significant implications for the behaviour, relationships and identities of those who work in the 
neoliberal university. The ethos of the market has required academics to adapt their behaviour to the 
self-centred competitiveness, driven by the ‘insistent individualism’ (Bennett 2008, 142)v of the 
academy that rewards displays of success in meeting targets and objectives. Narcissistic displays of 
excellence are required to account for oneself in acts of compulsory boastfulness. The academic 
labourer is induced to mimic the entrepreneur celebrated by capitalism, advertising the goods she sells 
in competition with other entrepreneurs.  
These behaviours stand in sharp contrast to traditional collegial behaviours associated with earlier 
forms of the modern university. vi  The defining features of academic friendship are also in tension 
with those of the neoliberal university, and we note these here with particular reference to the 
concepts of instrumentality, trust and choice. In the neoliberal university, the worth of activities is 
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almost exclusively determined by their instrumental value, by whether they are a successful 
investment of time and resource. Hence a battery of measures of performance is now in place to 
assess all aspects of performance, as in the UK’s Research Excellence Framework (REF), to name one 
prominent example. Pursuit of success and competitive advantage is so relentless and target-driven 
that academics cannot be trusted to teach their students well or to care about them; instead they must 
be audited and numerically rated by those students as if by customers buying and reviewing a service. 
vii  To survive and if possible to thrive in the neoliberal academy the academic labourer exercises 
choice as an entrepreneur. Sutton takes up the idea of choice ‘as part of the regulatory technology of 
governmentality’ (2017, 628), drawing on Foucault and Rose and Miller: 
The neo-liberalizing university positions academics as ‘active agents seeking to maximise 
their own advantage’; as individuals who are responsible for ‘calculating actions and 
outcomes’ (Rose & Miller 1992, p 198). Success at work requires each individual academic 
labourer to perpetually calculate and choose: for choice is a central tenet of neo-liberalism. 
(Sutton 2017, 628) 
In contrasting the non-instrumentality of friendship with the hyper-instrumentalism, distrust and 
encouragement of entrepreneurial choice in the neoliberal university, we are not suggesting that 
universities, as institutions, should model themselves on friendship, which is non-contractual, not 
bound by institutional procedures, and characterised by loose structures (Cordelli 2015).  Indeed, 
relationships between friends are routinely contrasted with other close relationships that are more 
appropriately described as institutions, like those between relatives and in marriage. Instead, our 
purpose is to indicate how the working environment of the neoliberal university contrasts radically 
and unfavourably with some defining features of friendship. We defend academic friendship as a 
relationship that ameliorates the ‘hidden injuries of the neoliberal university’ (Gill 2010). Hence we 
position the contemporary academy as a harsh workplace in which boundaries with private life are 
blurred by overwork in pursuit of neoliberal demands which, as we illustrate below, seem to be 
ramped-up year on year. Such demands may result in what Gill and Donaghue (2015, 91) call  
‘psychosocial and somatic catastrophe … that manifests in experiences of chronic stress, anxiety, 
exhaustion, insomnia and spiralling rates of physical and mental illness’. Contending that it may offer 
an antidote, in our concluding section we highlight academic friendship as both a defence and a means 
of resistance against the worst of these demands, but first we consider how this relationship plays out 
in and threatens the neoliberal academy.  
Friendship in the neoliberal workplace 
When Marilyn Friedman titled her 1993 collection of papers on moral theory and personal 
relationships ‘What are Friends for?’ she was not asking how friendship could be used for 
instrumental purposes. Her question is not about how workplace friendship, for example, might be 
harnessed to improve performance against measurable objectives - although managerialist forces in 
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the neoliberal academy would likely ask precisely this question.  Indeed, Rumens (2017, 1150) 
suggests that many well established studies of workplace friendships are focussed on how to improve 
productivity and performance for organizations thereby exhibiting managerial bias and control which 
‘chokes out any light we might wish to shed on other aspects of workplace friendships such as the 
personal and social significance of workplace friendships in their own right’ (1151). We turn now to 
one such study.  
While acknowledging the apparently obvious benefits of workplace friendship, Pillemer and Rothbard 
(2018, 635) point to expanding scholarship suggesting the ‘downsides’ of such relationships if these 
conflict with ‘core aspects of organizational life’ (638). Although not located in the academy, 
Pillemer and Rothbard’s (2018) paper is liable to Rumens’ (2017, 1150) criticism of studies which 
regard organizations ‘as though they have an objective existence that is independent of the people 
who inhabit them’. To take one of their ‘downsides’, Pillemer and Rothbard (2018) contend that 
conflict may arise between the socioemotional goals of friendship and the instrumental goals required 
for workplace success, including being distracted from tasks required at work. Such a concern sits 
uneasily with the lived experiences of many academics.  
Providing further evidence for our earlier claim that the contemporary academy is a harsh workplace, 
a recent work-life balance global survey (Bothwell 2018b) indicated that most academics work 
beyond their contracted hours, including weekends and holidays, some believe their job restricts their 
capacity to see friends and others believe they worked longer hours over the past three years than 
previously. Any time academic friends spend on non-academic activity is located in a context in 
which the lines between work and non-work hours have become increasingly blurred. Ultimately, too, 
the relatively limited time academic friends exert on personal non-instrumental activity is, we suggest, 
defensible on the grounds that it contributes to flourishing, to leading a meaningful life (Rumens, 
2017). Echoing Gill’s (2010) aforementioned ‘hidden injuries of the neoliberal university’, Hodgson 
(2016) writes evocatively of Lewis’ (2013) ‘fatigue university’ and she points to consolation from 
colleagues to alleviate our despair at failing to meet targets. Contra Pillemer and Rothbard (2018), that 
consolation from colleagues confirms White’s (1990) suggestion that working with friends not only 
brings satisfaction to those friends but that it can also benefit the workplace. Seeking consolation as 
an element of academic friendship providing emotional support and intrinsic rewards will function as 
a bulwark against work related stress and exhaustion (see Kram & Isabella, 1985). While Pillemer and 
Rothbard (2018, 640) assert that friends’ ‘devotion of resources to social relationships that go beyond 
work-based interdependencies and goals may compromise instrumental goals’, we suggest that such a 
compromise may be of relatively limited duration and minimal effect. So, too, the very notion that the 




We have already agreed with Friedman (1993) that special commitments to each other do not 
necessarily over-ride duties in non-voluntary professional relationships. The special duties academic 
friends owe to each other may well be subordinated to, at least given less immediate priority than, 
work-related activities and demands. As Keller (2004, 350-351) observes, ‘the good things about 
friendship do not always fit neatly alongside other goods’ and neither are good friends required ‘to 
provide each other with slavish, unconditional affirmation’ (334).  Academic friends will not, of 
necessity, ‘side’ with or show preferential treatment to each other at cost to others.  Indeed it may be 
‘actually misleading to say that we are necessarily or typically partial to our friends’ (Blum 1980, 55). 
Moreover, Keller (2004, 349) reminds us of the ‘general moral duties’ that pertain within friendship, 
including not to be manipulative or deceptive or to take advantage of others, and we argue that such 
moral duties extend to and characterise any and all decent workplace [and other] relationships.viii 
Yet if our universities follow Pillemer and Rothbard’s managerialist appropriation of friendship then 
they should implement strategies ‘to ameliorate the risks associated with workplace friendships’ 
(2018, 652) with, for example, ‘cross-functional or organization-wide coffee chats or presentations … 
to ensure that the boundaries of friendship groups are not perceived as impenetrable’ (2018, 652-3). 
All too apparent here is the urge to manage personal workplace friendships, ‘to fully leverage’ their 
benefits in pursuit of organizational goals apparently empowering ‘employees to optimize their 
relationships’ (Pillemer and Rothbard 2018, 653). Discernible too is the urge to control relationships 
in the workplace including the fabrication of acceptable friendships and the disruption of friendships 
if those are perceived, in any sense, to conflict with institutional goals.   
Seeking to manage and so control academic friendship would further evidence a distrust of academic 
labourers in an accountability culture already intent on ‘ever more perfect administrative control’ 
resulting in ‘a culture of suspicion’ (O’Neill 2002, 46-47).  It is amidst such a culture of suspicion that 
academics are not to be trusted and the very best features of academic friendship may be regarded 
more as threat than benefit.  Nonetheless, we turn now to some of the most obvious activities and 
benefits of academic friendship, focussing our attention on trust in such relationships in the face of 
distrust by their institutions.   
We have noted the variability of workplace relationships and associations permitting varying degrees 
of instrumentality, trust and choice. Acknowledging that ‘reasonably congenial’ relationships will 
occur across the workplace, White (1990, 85) suggests that ‘the situation will be transformed if they 
are real friends’. Academic colleagues will likely be engaged in shared activities such as co-
authorship, co-teaching and supervision, as well as scholarship and research.  However, such shared 
activities will not, necessarily, render their participants ‘real friends’, rather they will be colleagues 
working together in, at best, a friendly way which sustains collegiality. It is the degree of 
voluntariness, non-instrumentalism and, particularly, trust set alongside virtue, utility and pleasure, 
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which will distinguish a friend from a colleague although, in the literature, there is often an elision of 
collegialityix and friendship. Academic colleagues might well trust one another to complete a task and 
they might have chosen to work together but that relationship is outcomes based: there is a job to do 
and they have opted to collaborate for instrumental purposes. Unless they are friends they may not 
trust each other to express their doubts about, say, the value of that task or the prescribed procedures 
and stages for its target-based completion and evaluation. Colleagues working together are not 
necessarily friends because friendship, on our account, has as one of its central and defining features, 
interpersonal trust. Although such trust may extend to expecting from colleagues ‘technical 
competence (and minimal decency)’, trust in and of a friend will entail ‘a kind of moral competence’ 
and an expectation that a friend will appreciate the sort of ‘loyalty, kindness, and generosity’ required 
in a range of situations (Jones 1996, 7). Moreover, that moral competence will be predicated on a 
judgement, frequently developed over time, that a friend will be trustworthy and merit our trust 
(Hawley 2012). Trust, of course, entails risk and a lack of control as well as ‘systematic vulnerability’ 
with ‘the self at some danger’ and it will be role-related to the extent that an asymmetrical role 
relationship will result in an asymmetrical trust relationship (Flores and Solomon 1998, 220). We 
have already noted the rough equality, the approximate symmetry, between friends and hence trust in 
academic friendship is to be understood in several ways.  Academic friendship, by dint of shared 
academic pursuits, draws on intellectual trust as friends learn from and with each other but this 
extends to moral as well as intellectual growth. Not only are academic friends open to intellectual 
learning from each other but so too to what Friedman (1993, 205) describes as ‘the possibility of 
deep-level moral change’. This will demand a willingness for friends to hold to their own values and 
principles while simultaneously sustaining ‘an uneasy, although vital, balance’ with the sometimes 
differing views of friends ‘in  their unique, whole particularity’ (Friedman 1993, 205). This has 
important implications for both the voluntary and non-instrumental elements of friendship already 
emphasised and lends to the relationship both particular ways of doing academic friendship and a role 
in resistance.  
Academic friendship: resisting the neoliberal order 
Just as there appears to be no prospect of the emergence of any post neoliberal order that might 
displace or even reduce the dominance of market capitalism and its intrusion into all spheres of life, 
there is no end in sight to the dark times of the neoliberal academy. Yet we conclude by defending 
academic friendship as offering both a refuge and a means of resistance against the worst features of 
Ball’s (2016, 1049) technologies of ‘Market, Management and Performance’. Continuing to labour in 
the ‘university in ruins’ (Readings 1996), we have argued that academic friendship can provide social 
and emotional support. Concomitantly we have indicated that it can entail generative intellectual and 
moral activity and growth through trusting and honest reflection on, for example, ideas of practice and 
principles in research and scholarship and teaching and learning.  
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This argument matters because ways of doing academic friendship, often realized with humour, and 
premised on trust, non-instrumentalism and voluntariness stand in stark contrast to goal-oriented 
performativity and institutionally determined and managed sets of rules and prescriptions. For 
Friedman (1993) friendship offers possibilities for disruption and ‘the right to question the moral 
legitimacy of any contingent moral claim’ (1993, 242). Hence Taylor and Tyler’s friendship does 
entail that they question the moral legitimacy of some institutional claims and prescriptions. It is their 
particular relationship, as friends who trust, like, and respect each other, that affords them the freedom 
to share each other’s company ‘motivated by their own needs, desires, attractions, and fears, rather 
than, and often in opposition to, the expectations and ascribed roles of their found communities’ 
(Friedman 1993, 249).x  Accordingly, Tyler and Taylor question some of the prevailing imperatives 
and directives of the academy today, often echoing Sutton’s (2017, 627) claim that technologies of 
performativity have overridden education’s  purpose, morally defined as a public good. 
In trying to survive and flourish in the neoliberal academy Taylor and Tyler can defend academic 
friendship by making time and protecting spaces for friendship, both in shared academic work and in 
being vigilant in shielding pockets of creativity, trust and innovation that foster voluntary and 
intrinsically rewarding work, regardless of its amenability to measurement against targets and KPIs. 
Such vigilance calls for critical awareness of managerialism’s relentless drive to appropriate and 
ultimately distort all forms of workplace association, imposing on academic labourers a regime of 
performativity sometimes overlaid with a veneer of friendliness in the form of superficial conviviality. 
A drive to hitch workplace friendships to always extrinsically defined ends, such as proffering and 
requiring mentorship sometimes in the guise of friendshipxi, should prompt protection of friendship 
precisely because of its voluntary nature.  
Under the conditions and virtues we have attributed to friendship academic friends may be prompted 
to resist imperatives to be entrepreneurial choosers in competition with one another and to enact 
alternative values. They might regard colleagues and students as allies worthy of care, rather than 
competitors and customers. The small spaces of authenticity afforded by friendship can encourage 
forms of honest critical reflection liberated from requirements to display success and measurable 
outcomes at all costs. Although the form of academic friendship we have defended has been largely 
focused on an imagined professional and personal academic friendship, it also suggests extending 
some features of friendship more widely. Understanding friendship and solidarity as distinctive 
concepts, friendship, nonetheless, entails acting in solidarity with other academic labourers who are 
also alert to prevailing neoliberal regimes, refusing to be seduced into uncritical compliance and 
holding fast to shared intellectual interests and commitments.  Solidarity with colleagues inspired by 
the values of academic friendship should also alert us to situations in which we may be complicit in 
managing fellow academic labourers in various forms including, for example, peer review, in which 
we might resist the urge to be competitively dismissive.  So while we have focussed here on a defence 
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and celebration of ‘real’ friendships, in which the personal and the academic complement each other, 
we should where we can extend the virtues and best features of such relationships to a wider circle of 
colleagues. While friendship, on our account, will not be mandated and academics should resist any 
attempts to manage and control it, its best features are those that might usefully be borrowed in any 
and all academic relationships. Although we have stressed that real friendship is by definition 
intrinsically valuable it can also create spaces that might foster educationally worthwhile change, 
imagining different views and practices in the face of homogenizing and stultifying regulation, as well 
as ongoing reflection on the very idea of the university.  Those spaces should not, of course, be the 
exclusive domain of friends but they might be enriched by at least some of the best virtues of 
friendship.  
Finally, our defence of academic friendship in the dark times of the neoliberal academy is most 
decidedly not intended to reinforce the ‘amiable passivity of the academic life’ (Inglis 2011). 
Reflecting on his [re]formation as ‘a neoliberal academic subject’ and drawing on Inglis’ (2011) 
image of a beast, Ball (2012)  talks of a ‘rough neoliberal beast’. In the face of such a beast, one 
means of responding to both Ball’s and Inglis’ calls for resistance is, we contend, academic 
friendship. Educationists are urged ‘to become increasingly critically reflexive, politically aware’ in 
order to ‘reawaken to their real educational work - the ethical and moral project that most signed up to 
but which has since become lost’ (Ball 2012, 1046).  While academic friendship cannot slay Ball’s 
(2016) slouching neoliberal beast, we do suggest it is worth defending it to help us to remain critically 
reflexive, to help us to wake-up, and to confront and maybe even to go some way towards taming that 
beast.  
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i ‘Outputs’ refer to the UK’s REF (Research Excellence Framework), a peer review process with three elements, 
one of which is ‘outputs’ -  publications, performances and exhibitions, see http://www.ref.ac.uk/about/whatref/.  
ii  SMART objectives are, often, Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound but different 
universities use modified forms (e.g. strategic not specific).  
iii The UK’s Universities and Colleges Union (UCU) drawing on HESA (Higher Education Statistics Agency) 
data for 2014/15, notes ‘at least 53% of all academics employed in the sector are on some form of insecure 
contract’ with many staff ‘employed as “workers”, paid by the assignment, on lower pay rates and with fewer 
employment rights’ at https://www.ucu.org.uk/media/8384/Precarious-work-in-higher-education-November-
2016-update/pdf/ucu_precariouscontracts_hereport_nov16_.pdf) . See 
https://www.ucu.org.uk/media/7995/Precarious-work-in-higher-education-a-snapshot-of-insecure-contracts-and-
institutional-attitudes-Apr-16/pdf/ucu_precariouscontract_hereport_apr16.pdf for current data. 
iv These are all listed by various UK universities. A search for ‘university values’ reveals a plethora of such 
terms. 
v While we share Bennett’s criticism of competitive individualism, we would wish to distinguish between the 
self-interest of such ethical egoism and ethical individualism as a defence of the individual as the primary unit 
of moral concern.  
vi But also see Bacon (2014) for neo-collegiality. 
vii For example the UK’s National Student Survey (NSS) at  https://www.thestudentsurvey.com/about.php and 
Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) at https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/advice-and-
guidance/teaching/what-is-the-tef/. 
viii Of course we acknowledge the ‘dark side of friendship’ (Fehr, 1996:179) for both friends and others and so 
the need for some regulation, e.g. through codes of conduct on workplace relations, to head off workplace 
romances and sexual liaisons that, misaligned with power, might undermine the moral rectitude of the institution 
and cause individual harm.       
ix While collegiality might be understood as ‘a structured form of collaborative decision-making’ and, often, as 
‘a mode of behaviour, having in mind relations between colleagues which are mutually supportive, geared to the 
good of the collective over the individual and not fixated on rank’ (Bacon, 2014:3), our argument is that 
academic friendship is not geared to the good of the collective although, of course, it may yield such a dividend. 
x Friedman was writing here of friendship amongst women but we are extending her disruptive possibilities to 
academic friendships.  
xi We note Kram (1983:620) includes friendship as one of mentoring’s psychosocial functions although she 
notes that will likely develop over time particularly during the ‘redefinition phase’ when ‘the relationship 
becomes, primarily, a friendship’.   
                                                          
